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Traveling to The Hague
in a Worn-Out Shoe
Friedrich K. Juenger*
American jurisdictional law is unique. Other nations-both in the civil
and in the common law orbit-have national "long-arm statutes" that
delineate the scope of general and specific jurisdiction. These foreign
enactments enumerate, in a reasonably clear and concise fashion, the
jurisdictional bases available for international litigation, while we rely on
such vague and open-ended concepts as "minimum contacts" or "purposeful
availment." Even more importantly, abroad, jurisdiction is not considered to
be a constitutional matter.
We are the only country to leave jurisdiction to a motley array of
(frequently poorly drafted and construed) state statutes, whose application to
specific cases is subject to a vacillating and confused Supreme Court case
law. These differences between our jurisdictional notions and those that
prevail in the rest of the world are rooted in history.
Civil law countries have long premised jurisdiction on a relationship
between the dispute and the forum. In marked contrast, the English common
law courts grounded jurisdiction on an official act: the service of process on
the defendant. That act conferred general jurisdiction, so that a defendant
who was served in England was amenable to the common law courts'
jurisdiction, whether or not he or the dispute had any contacts with the
scepter'd isle. Those who could not be served in England could not be sued
there, however strong the link of the dispute with England might be.
In the nineteenth century, however, it became apparent that these
archaic jurisdictional notions no longer suited a country with far-flung
commercial activities. Responding to felt necessities, the 1852 Common
Law Procedure Act authorized a species of long-arm jurisdiction by
conferring discretionary power to serve defendants abroad,' a scheme
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1. See Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 76, §§ 221, 227 (Eng.).
incorporated in Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the United
Kingdom's "long-arm statute."2 Although framed-bowing to tradition-in
terms of service of process, it in fact resembles the civil law approach in that
it enumerates a list of bases for the exercise of general and specific
jurisdiction.
American courts, however, not cognizant of the progress made in the
United Kingdom, followed the common law tradition of considering the
service of process within the forum as both- necessary and sufficient.
Amazingly, several decades after the U.K. reform, the Supreme Court, in
Pennoyer v. Neff,3 not only endorsed that tradition but gave it constitutional
stature. Supposedly, that was compelled by the newly adopted Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, even though the Fourteenth
Amendment's purpose was the protection of individual liberties rather than
state sovereignty.
Pennoyer caused much mischief. It was too broad because it permitted
adjudication in states with which the defendant had little or no contacts, as
Grace v. MacArthur drastically illustrated.4 At the same time, it was too
narrow. Process servers could not stalk artificial entities that supposedly did
not even exist outside the state of incorporation. To adapt the law to the
normative force of fact, over the years the Justices condoned a number of
contrivances to accommodate jurisdictional necessities, such as the fiction of
an "implied consent"5 or an equally fictitious corporate "presence., 6 Both of
these fictions allowed state courts to exercise general jurisdiction over
corporations that were neither incorporated nor had their principal place of
business in the forum.
Tired of fictions, the Supreme Court at long last laid down new
principles in its 1945 landmark decision International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.7 In effect, Shoe "civilized" in personam jurisdiction by
recognizing that not only the magic act of service but also a relationship
(which the Court confusingly dubbed "minimum contacts") may enable the
forum to adjudicate actions against nonresidents.! Such a relationship exists,
of course, whenever the defendant is a forum resident. In the case of a legal
entity, the place where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business
provides similarly close contacts.
2. See Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 11 (1962) (U.K.).
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (upholding jurisdiction
over defendant served while flying over forum state).
5. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (upholding Massachusetts' "implied
consent" statute).
6. See, e.g., St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226 (1913) (analyzing a Texas
corporation's "presence" in New York).
7. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. Id. at 316.
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Despite this new and promising start, Pennoyer still rules us from its
grave. That case's over-breadth remained intact-service within the forum
remained a basis for general jurisdiction.9 Also, because Shoe endorsed the
"implied consent" and "presence" cases, it failed to limit general
jurisdiction-as other nations do"-over nonresident corporations to their
principal place of business and the state of incorporation and authorized the
exercise of general in personam jurisdiction as long as the defendant was
"doing business" in the forum state."
Had the Justices taken the opportunity to glance at foreign jurisdictional
practices-at least those prevailing in the United Kingdom-they could have
seized the opportunity to align American law with world standards. But
instead of drawing a sharp line between general and specific jurisdiction, the
Shoe opinion envisaged a spectrum of activities ranging from "continuous
and systematic" to "single or isolated" acts.'2 Whereas the latter would at
best confer specific jurisdiction, the former might authorize the forum to
adjudicate causes of action that are unrelated to the defendant's forum
activities.
As could have been expected, these weasel words have caused, and to
this day continue to cause, serious problems in practical application. Another
shortcoming of the Shoe opinion is that it left intact tag jurisdiction, to which
the Court gave a new lease on life in Burnham v. Superior Court.3 In
consequence, we now have two types of exorbitant general jurisdiction: tag
jurisdiction and "doing business" jurisdiction, the second of which cannot
even be defined.
Nor does specific jurisdiction present a much rosier picture. Verbiage
such as "purposeful availment"'" or "purposeful direction,"' 5 used by the
Justices in a series of vacillating and usually split opinions embellishing on
Shoe's "minimum contacts," merely added further confusion. To this day,
the Supreme Court has given little guidance on precisely where the line
between general and specific jurisdiction over foreign entities should be
drawn.
9. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990).
10. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European
Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1207-08 (1984).
11. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-19.
12. Id.
13. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
14. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
15. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality
opinion).
Fifty-five years after Shoe, we still do not know when states may assert
general jurisdiction over nonresident corporations. Only one Supreme Court
decision rendered after Shoe, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,j6
explicitly condoned a state court's exercise of general jurisdiction. But given
the unique facts of Perkins, this precedent sheds little light on the potential
scope of general jurisdiction." In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall,'8 the Court dealt with but ultimately rejected the assertion of general
jurisdiction. The remarkable aspect of this case is not the majority opinion
but Justice Brennan's dissent. In spite of the defendant's tenuous
relationship with the forum, he argued that the Texas court could have
asserted not only specific but general jurisdiction as well. 9
The Court's skimpy case law leaves unanswered a number of obvious
questions. Can anyone injured anywhere by a car manufactured in
Wolfsburg, Germany, sue the Volkwagenwerke AG in whatever state offers
the best recovery? And, do a subsidiary's activities render the parent
amenable to general jurisdiction on any cause of action, wherever it might
have "arisen?"
The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts is of no help, because it merely
reiterates what the Supreme Court said in Shoe:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation which does business in the state with respect to causes
of action that do not arise from the business done in the state if this
business is so continuous and substantial as to make it reasonable
for the state to exercise jurisdiction."
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments simply incorporates the
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts by reference." Similarly, the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law would subject any foreign individual or
entity to general jurisdiction if he, she, or it "regularly carries on business in
the state."22 While they purport to set forth principles of international law,
the Reporters fail to mention the discrepancy between American and foreign
views on that point.
As might be expected, when the American delegation met with the
members of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, our
16. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
17. During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the only "presence" the defendant
Philippine corporation could be said to have anywhere was in Ohio, from where its president
conducted its activities. See id. at 447-48.
18. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
19. Id. at 423-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 47(2) (1971).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 5 (1982).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421(2)(h) (1987).
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reliance on "doing business" jurisdiction (which has been roundly criticized
even in American law journals), struck the representatives of other nations
as strange. It was as if we tried to sell to other nations the institution of an
Electoral College.
Such resistance is understandable if one considers that jurisdictional
quirks are not our only peculiarity. No other country routinely tries civil
actions to a jury or authorizes discovery to the extent we do. Most outlaw
contingent fees, and many follow the "English rule" that loser pays all.23
These facets of American practice result in judgments that boggle foreign
lawyers' minds. It could therefore hardly be expected that vague and
undefined rules that subject foreign parties to jurisdiction in the U.S. would
be easy to sell.
Both tag and "doing business" jurisdiction were relegated to Article 18's
list of outlawed exorbitant bases in the current draft convention, which
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Prohibited grounds of jurisdiction
1. Where the defendant is habitually resident in a Contracting State,
the application of a rule of jurisdiction provided for under the
national law of a Contracting State is prohibited if there is no
substantial connection between that State and the dispute.
2. In particular, jurisdiction shall not be exercised by the courts of a
Contracting State on the basis solely of one or more of the
following -
e) the carrying on of commercial or other activities by the defendant
in that State, except where the dispute is directly related to those
activities;
f) the service of a writ upon the defendant in that State.. ..
23. See Smith Kline & French Labs., Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (Eng. C.A.)
(Denning, M.R.) (observing that "[a]s a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States"); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) (noting reasons
that U.S. courts are attractive to plaintiffs).
24. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Art. 18, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.htm
[herinafter Draft Convention].
The accompanying report by Professors Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar
explains the reasons for including "doing business" general jurisdiction in
Article 18 as follows:
This ground of jurisdiction gave rise to considerable discussion...
partly because of the difficulty of deciding exactly how far such a
flexible connection, one which has to be appraised by the court in
each particular case, can be said to extend ... in ... situations...
when the claim has no specific relationship with the activity carried
on by the defendant in the State.... [T]here is a significant margin
of uncertainty in applying it, because of the difficulty of
determining the quality and quantity of activity which is
needed. ...'
The Report does, however, leave room for a compromise. Despite the
vagueness of the term "doing business," which is anathema to civilian
jurists, the Report would not outlaw it entirely. Instead, the Reporters
suggest its use for purposes of specific jurisdiction: "'[T]ransacting
business' ... may reflect a sufficient link between the dispute and the State
in which the activity is carried on...
However, neither this compromise solution nor the drafters' attempts to
devise more precise jurisdictional provisions than our amorphous "minimum
contacts" cum "purposeful availment/direction," are apt to satisfy those who
have a practical interest in jurisdictional matters. Thus the U.S. Department
of State's representative sent a letter to the Secretary General of the Hague
Conference in which he criticized various aspects of the draft convention.
He wrote, in pertinent part, as follows:
We believe that unless there is a clear, well-defined permitted area
of jurisdiction that allows for growth and development in the future,
the convention will not have the flexibility it needs to meet the
requirements of a changing world. In our view, there should be... a
substantial pennitted area..'. . Regrettably, the current draft creates
rigid principles and factors for prohibiting jurisdiction.... We
detected very limited support for [the draft's rules on "transacting
business"].... Yet even that language may not go far enough to
satisfy the litigating bar ..
25. Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar, Report of the Special Commission 77 (Prelim. Doc. 11),
available at http://www.hcch.netle/workprogljdgm.html.
26. Id. at 78.
27. Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, to
J.H.A. Loon, Secretary General, Hague Conference on Private International Law 5, 7 (Feb. 22, 2000)
(on file with Professor William S. Dodge).
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This language suggests that the State Department is not only concerned
about a possible rejection of the draft convention's "transaction of business"
provision but would also like to remove "doing business" general
jurisdiction from the list of exorbitant bases. In later testimony before a
House subcommittee, the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International
Law stated that "after extensive consultations with industry and consumer
groups, the private bar, and with government litigators, the Department of
State concluded that ... [the draft convention] is not close to being ratifiable
in the United States and cannot be an effective vehicle for final
negotiations."2 While insistence on American-style general jurisdiction was
not the only reason for this assessment, concerns about limiting its sway did
play a role. The State Department's consultations with interested groups
revealed their disenchantment, with provisions of the draft convention that
would curtail either Pennoyer tag jurisdiction or protect foreign corporations
from American long-arm legislation.
The concern about shortening the long arm is not entirely
unreasonable. 9 In practice, jurisdictional exorbitance does have its virtues. It
can be used as a powerful means of vindicating the interests of parties who
have suffered at the hands of foreign torturers and corporations that
employed slave labor. In fact, the Hague Conference did take into account
the concerns of human rights groups over losing the jurisdictional means to
accomplish this end. Proposals thai would preserve this means are included
as bracketed provisions in Article 18 of the current draft.30 I leave it to others
who are better equipped to discuss these reservations and their prospects. I
may, however, note parenthetically, that the bracketed text is not limited to
tag and "doing business," but includes a panoply of other jurisdictional
bases, notably the presence of assets belonging to the defendant within the
forum, the nationality of either party, plaintiff's domicile or simple choice,
and the defendant's mere presence. With one exception, these options are,
however, of no use in an American court as they are at odds with the
constitutional constraints our Supreme Court has established.
The possible exception is asset-based jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner'
meant to abolish the kind of quasi in rem jurisdiction that allows the seizure
28. Testimony of Jeffery D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, U.S.
Department of State, Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on
the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (June 29, 2000), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/kova0629.htm#_ftnref2.
29. For some questions about the need for a judgments convention in the United States, see
Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111 (1998).
30. See Draft Convention, supra note 24, Art. 18(3).
31. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
of property belonging to the defendant to serve as the foundation for a
lawsuit that might deprive the defendant of his rights. In a cryptic footnote,
however, the Court left open the possibility of using asset-based jurisdiction
"when no other forum is available."32 Arguably, that would permit the
exercise of full in personam jurisdiction that is not limited to the value of the
assets seized. The panoply of possibilities available to plaintiffs to seek
damages for human rights violations is exceedingly broad. In practical
application it would amount to universal judicial jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court, however, has long since foreclosed this possibility by its "minimum
contacts" test, which, being supposedly based on the Due Process clause,
cannot be amended by treaty. Once again, at the Hague Conference we find
ourselves at odds with the rest of the world.
The Supreme Court got us into this mess and, because it
constitutionalized jurisdiction, only the Justices can get us out of it. But that
too seems unlikely. It took the Court sixty-seven years to discard the
obviously misguided Pennoyer principles. For the next fifty-five years it
struggled, less than successfully, to make those it adopted in the Shoe case
work. The Justices, however, seem disinclined to resort to the comparative
method in the interest of law reform, something they failed to do in both of
these cases. Justice Breyer's dissent in Printz v. United States said that "we
are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there
may be relevant political and structural differences between their systems
and our own.... But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical
light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal
problem.... "33  In a footnote, Justice Scalia roundly rebuffed Justice
Breyer's suggestion:
JUSTICE BREYER's dissent would have us consider the benefits
that other countries, and the European Union, believe they have
derived from federal systems that are different from ours. We think
such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution.... The fact is that our federalism is not Europe's. It'is
"the unique contribution of the Framers to political science and
political theory."34
'nuff said.
32. Id. at211 n.37.
33. 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 921 n.ll (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
